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AI Security

Protecting AI systems from threats, vulnerabilities, and adversarial attacks

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View The list finally caught the god agent
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By Adesh Gairola

The list finally caught the god agent

A deterministic decision point outside the model, in the live path, that decides before every action executes: that's the TLDR of every mitigation in the 2026 OWASP LLM Top 10. Excessive Agency jumped from rank 6 to rank 3, checked for the first time against 7,714 real incidents instead of a practitioner vote alone. Read the mitigations, not the ranks, and they all converge on one prescription: mediate everything.

View Claude Tag: an agent that acts as itself, not on your behalf
Featured image for Claude Tag: an agent that acts as itself, not on your behalf

By Adesh Gairola

Claude Tag: an agent that acts as itself, not on your behalf

Claude Tag puts @Claude in Slack as its own per-channel service account, not on behalf of the person who asked. That breaks the delegation model everyone converged on, where the audit log can still name a human. Useful, but it revives the old service-account problems with an AI on top.

View Kill the God Agent: how we think about agent security
Featured image for Kill the God Agent: how we think about agent security

By Adesh Gairola

Kill the God Agent: how we think about agent security

A God Agent is one model wired to every tool on one shared identity, holding the whole lethal trifecta at once: it reads untrusted content, touches private data, and talks to the outside world. You can't filter prompt injection out of that, so you change the architecture instead. Three deterministic moves: scope every agent, sign every call, stop every breach. Break even one leg of the trifecta and the blast radius shrinks.

View Agent identity isn't solved. Here's the model I use anyway.
Featured image for Agent identity isn't solved. Here's the model I use anyway.

By Adesh Gairola

Agent identity isn't solved. Here's the model I use anyway.

Agent identity makes more sense as four stacked layers: a tamper-proof token format, cryptographic proof of which workload is running, a delegation chain that keeps the human as the subject, and a way to onboard to a service an agent has never met. Climb all four and you've proven who the agent is. You still haven't proven that what it did was okay.